

Situated Normativity: The Normative Aspect of Embodied Cognition in Unreflective Action

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In everyday life we often act adequately, yet without deliberation. For instance, we immediately obtain and maintain an appropriate distance from others in an elevator. The notion of normativity implied here is a very basic one, namely distinguishing adequate from inadequate, correct from incorrect, or better from worse in the context of a particular situation. In the first part of this paper I investigate such 'situated normativity' by focusing on unreflective expert action. More particularly, I use Wittgenstein's examples of craftsmen (tailors and architects) absorbed in action to introduce situated normativity. Situated normativity can be understood as the normative aspect of embodied cognition in unreflective skillful action. I develop Wittgenstein's insight that a peculiar type of affective behaviour, 'directed discontent', is essential for getting things right without reflection. Directed discontent is a reaction of appreciation in action and is introduced as a paradigmatic expression of situated normativity. In the second part I discuss Wittgenstein's ideas on the normativity of what he calls 'blind' rule-following and the 'bedrock' of immediate action. What matters for understanding the normativity of (even 'blind') rule-following, is not that one has the capacity for linguistic articulation or reflection but that one is reliably participating in a communal custom. In the third part I further investigate the complex relationships between unreflective skillful action, perception, emotion, and normativity. Part of this entails an account of the link between normativity at the level of the expert's socio-cultural practice and the individual's situated and lived normativity.

1. Introduction

In many situations in our daily lives we act adequately, yet unreflectively. With certainty and fluency we turn the pages of a book, maintain an appropriate distance from the other people in an elevator, and without deliberation we stop the pedestrian next to us, who, while about to cross the street, does not notice an oncoming car. Often we just act and normally this immediate action is adequate.

It is quite amazing that even without explicit deliberation we normally act in ways that are appropriate from the point of view of socio-cultural practice. Wittgenstein's descriptions of architects and tailors at work contribute to a better understanding of the links between the unreflective actions of an individual and socially constituted norms. He

shows in his ‘Lectures on Aesthetics’ (Wittgenstein 1966; henceforth LA)¹ that skill, emotion, and appreciation are crucial for understanding how expert craftsmen act correctly. One of my aspirations in writing this paper is to contribute to a better understanding of the normative aspect of unreflective action via a better understanding of how expertise works in specialised skill domains, such as architecture or tailoring. I will refer to this normative aspect of unreflective action as ‘situated normativity’ or, to use a Wittgensteinian term that will be introduced below in section 2, ‘*instinctive* normative action’. The central question of this paper is: What is situated normativity?

I am especially interested in understanding the following three aspects of this phenomenon: the contexts in which it develops and occurs, the role of emotion, and the lived nature of situated normativity. It is important to notice that emotion is an important facet of ‘embodied cognition’ (Dreyfus 1992/1972; Varela et al. 1991; Thompson 2007; Damasio 1999; Frijda 2007). The third aspect refers to the individual’s first-person experience of normative tension, for example when one stands too close to see a large painting well and is immediately compelled to step back. (Merleau-Ponty 2002/1945—henceforth PP—p. 352. See also Kelly 2005; Dreyfus and Kelly 2007.) In addition, I will pay special attention to the relationship between normativity at the social level and at the individual level. The notion of normativity implied here is a very basic one: it is revealed when we distinguish better from worse, correct from incorrect, optimal from suboptimal, or adequate from inadequate in the context of a specific situation. However, the normative adequacy of an object in some field of expertise, such as architecture or tailoring, is ultimately not founded in any individual’s appreciation but in a socio-cultural practice.² We will have to understand how an individual’s situated normativity can be in accordance with social norms. To use a Wittgensteinian way of putting this, we will have to investigate how rules *compel* the skilled individual. We will see that an interesting type of affective behaviour plays an essential role in the way the individual’s actions are responsive to these norms.

¹ Wittgenstein delivered these lectures in 1938. The published notes were not written by Wittgenstein himself but by students who attended these lectures.

² Elsewhere (Rietveld 2008b) I suggest that *not all* normativity is socially constituted. In at least some minimal cases (of for instance the adequate perception of a thing) the nature of the normativity seems to be, in Dreyfus’s words, ‘an innate, bodily, non-social form of normativity’ (personal communication). But my remarks here focus on the (in)correctness of the craftsman’s object (for example the correctness of the suit the tailor is working on). This type of normativity is socially constituted.

Of course not all of our life is spent in a state of unreflective action. Sometimes we lack the relevant skills, things go very wrong, or situations are too complex, thus forcing us to reflect or deliberate explicitly (and sometimes even in a detached way). However, I will restrict myself as much as possible to investigating those episodes where the activities of a skillful individual unfold without reflection on his or her part. Actions of this type get pigeonholed in various ways: 'pre-reflective', 'non-representational', 'intuitive', 'habitual', 'instinctive', 'unreflective bodily coping', 'impulsive', 'non-propositional', 'tacit', 'pre-thematic', 'involved skillful coping', 'know-how', etc. I will call them 'unreflective actions' here. It is the pre-reflective and non-propositional character of this type of action that makes understanding it a challenge. In a sense, the difficulty of characterizing pre-reflective experience is comparable to what we encounter with respect to characterizing phenomena such as, for instance, a party's atmosphere or a feeling of attraction to someone or something.

In the situations of adequate unreflective performance on which I will focus, action is not guided by explicit reasoning, nor completely causally determined by the environment, but has its own peculiar type of agency and cognition. To follow Merleau-Ponty's (PP) suggestion, it is a form of *embodied* intelligence or cognition that is 'motivated' by the situation. An advantage of my focus on unreflective actions of skilled individuals (or experts even) is that it makes immediately clear that this type of activity can take complex contexts into account.

A consequence of restricting myself to episodes of unreflective action is that while discussing the activities of, for example, architects, I will focus on a particular facet of how they operate. I am neglecting all their painstaking deliberations about ways of dealing with the specific location and with the client's demands, or the role of creative imagination in coming up with a vision and a first design, or, finally, the last phase of a project in which an architect (or, more likely, her assistant) specifies the design in a very detailed way, with all the measurements included, for those who will construct the building. That is all part of the architect's job, but still, it is also common practice that architects spend a lot of time on the improvement of their first design or sketch. That is the phase in which an *adequate* design is developed and where the phenomena that we are discussing are very relevant.

At the core of Wittgenstein's (LA) descriptions of craftsmen at work, we will encounter the concept called '*directed discontent*' (Rietveld 2004). As far as I know, this interesting notion has so far been neglected in the secondary literature on Wittgenstein's ideas on normativity.

Directed discontent describes an internal relation between, on the one hand, the behaviour³ and lived experience of a craftsman and, on the other, the object⁴ on which he is working. I call directed discontent ‘*affective behaviour*’, because this fast instinctive reaction of appreciation precedes, in a sense, the distinction between emotion and cognition. Like being attracted to something it is affective and behavioural at the same time. The use of the term ‘affective behaviour’ also intends to show that a course of action was already under way and is now *affected* as a result of the perceived state of the object. We will see that being affectively influenced has everything to do with the individual’s embodiment, in particular with his or her ingrained ‘concerns’. The latter notion covers all that matters to an individual (Frijda 1986, 2007; Lambie and Marcel 2002; Bennett and Hacker 2003).

Expertise and skill are acquired through a history of training and experience in a socio-cultural practice. Once a skill is acquired, the relationship between body and world is modified. The individual is now attuned to a familiar environment. At that moment the level of ability rises to the point where the individual is able to perceive and respond unreflectively, yet adequately, to what Gibson called ‘*affordances*’ (Gibson 1979, p. 127; Michaels 2003). Affordances are in this paper understood as an organism’s possibilities for action in some situation.⁵ I focus on the phenomenology of affordances.⁶ Or better, on the phenomenological description and analysis of an individual’s responsiveness to affordances. In particular it is important to develop a better under-

³ I do not contrast the notion ‘behaviour’ with ‘action’. However, even when performed unreflectively by the individual, these two types of doings should be distinguished from things that merely happen to him or her.

⁴ I use ‘object’ to refer to what directed discontent is directed at. This can be a thing, as in Wittgenstein’s descriptions discussed below, but also an event or a person.

⁵ Both humans and non-human animals (for the sake of brevity ‘animals’) can perceive affordances. McDowell, for instance, recently wrote: ‘[R]esponsiveness to affordances, necessarily bound up with embodied coping skills, is something we share with other animals’ (McDowell 2007, p. 344). According to Sanders (1999) and Colombetti (2005) *both* the notions of ‘valence’ (Lewin 1935) and of ‘affordance’ can be traced back to Kurt Lewin’s (1935) term ‘*Aufforderungscharakter*’, which he had coined in 1926, according to Sanders (1999, p. 129). The Gestalt psychologist Koffka (1935) used the term ‘demand-character’ to characterize *Aufforderungscharakter* (see Sanders 1999, p. 129). Merleau-Ponty (PP) was strongly influenced by the Gestalt psychologists and, as we will see in section 5.3.3, well aware of the phenomenon that we nowadays characterize by the name of affordance.

⁶ As noted by Dreyfus and Kelly, ‘Gibson himself did not emphasize the phenomenology of affordances, and indeed explicitly denied that affordances are defined in terms of their phenomenology in his arguments with the Gestaltists’ (Dreyfus and Kelly 2007, p. 52). See Sanders (1999) and Michaels (2003) for discussions on the issue of affordances and ontology, as I cannot go into this here.

standing of the way skilled individuals are responsive to relevant affordances while engaged in a flow of actions. Part of the first-person experience of such responsiveness is that affordances are not *mere* possibilities for action but are experienced as *potentiating* and having *affective allure*. Dreyfus and Kelly (2007, p. 52) describe the phenomenology of affordances as ‘experience in which the world solicits a certain kind of activity’. Like them, I will sometimes use ‘solicitations to act’ or ‘solicitations’ as synonyms for affordances.

I will suggest that the skillful individual’s responsiveness to *relevant* affordances forms the core of the normative aspect of unreflective action. I will refer to such responsiveness as ‘being moved to improve’ by a relevant affordance or object.⁷ I am aware that this technical notion will sound odd to most philosophers. Still I want to use it here, because it helps me to do justice to the facets of emotion and normativity in the phenomenology of this responsiveness.

To get an idea of the phenomenon of being moved to improve, consider the situation in the elevator (Dreyfus 2002b, pp. 417–18). There we allow ourselves to be drawn to obtain and maintain an appropriate distance from the other person(s) in it. Maintaining unreflectively the distance that is considered appropriate in one’s culture is an example of ‘situated normativity’. Note that ‘allow ourselves’ suggests that there is some form of agency involved in the type of unreflective action I am investigating. (I will discuss the nature of agency and freedom in unreflective action elsewhere; see Rietveld (2008b) for some first ideas.)

For Wittgenstein (LA), craftsmanship is characterized by appreciation, orientation at correctness, and immediate reactions to a given situation. In section 2 I will discuss how Wittgenstein presents these concepts as relevant for understanding the nature of the normativity of the craftsmen’s actions. In section 3 I will introduce and develop the concept of ‘directed discontent’ in the case of craftsmen at work, show the context within which it operates, and explain why this notion is important. We will also see how directed discontent is lived from the first-person perspective. The directed discontent expressed by craftsmen can be considered as prototypical for a variety of situations of instinctive normative action and provides us with a concrete example of the phenomenon of being moved to improve by a relevant affordance. In section 4 I will turn to Wittgenstein’s ideas on the normativity of what he calls ‘blind’ rule-following and the ‘bedrock’ of

⁷ Although I prefer the *relational* and (here) phenomenological notions of ‘affordance’ and ‘solicitation’ over the term ‘object’, I will also use ‘object’ to refer to the thing a craftsman is working on or person that he is interacting with.

immediate action (Wittgenstein 1953). In section 5 I will further investigate the relationships between perception, emotion, and normativity in unreflective action. This will shed further light on the phenomenon of being moved to improve. Part of this is a discussion of the link between normativity at the level of the individual and the socio-cultural practice.

2. Situated normativity in unreflective action: the case of Wittgenstein's craftsmen

In LA Wittgenstein presents aesthetics as a very broad domain, which includes some practices of craftsmanship. For instance, in a core example he describes the engaged reaction of an architect who 'instinctively' corrects the design of a door. According to Wittgenstein, the central concept to be explained concerning aesthetic practices in his broad sense is 'appreciation' of objects in the craftsman's socio-cultural practice. Wittgenstein presents directed discontent as a subtle reaction of appreciation.

To avoid misunderstanding I must briefly explain my use of 'instinct' in this paper. Wittgenstein (1976; original text from 1937–38) criticizes the use of the word 'intuition' with respect to skillful behaviour. He prefers to use 'instinct' in that context (De Lara 2003), probably to stress the *bodily* basis of this type of know-how. For him instinctive reactions of this type can be socially acquired and controlled. They are flexible in the sense that these reactions are sensitive to the situational context. I will use 'instinct' in this peculiar and broad sense too, for instance in my notion of 'instinctive normative action'.

The craftsman's appreciations have an evaluative character and are expressed in his absorbed ways of selecting and acting. Such reactions of appreciation are directed at the correctness of the object. Appreciation of an object by Wittgenstein's expert craftsman is engaged, immediate, non-deliberative, and non-propositional, as opposed to 'judging', which is more detached, deliberative, and propositional. Appreciation shows itself in *the way* of (re)acting (LA, p. 7). So, in such unreflective action objects are typically appreciated on-line, in the process of the craftsman's working at improving them.

Appreciation has a normative character: it normally concerns the *correctness* of an object for the appreciator within its context. Importantly, because contexts are in general complex it is not possible to make fully *explicit* what appreciation consists of (LA, p. 7). Appreciation in a situation takes place within a practice and within a culture

(LA, p. 11). Appreciation of the object (in context) by the craftsman is normative without being (explicitly or implicitly) guided by rules. Although the tailor may have incorporated the rules of his practice years ago, he normally does not refer to these rules in the situation.

Wittgenstein's expert tailor generates a situated type of normativity. While the socio-cultural practice of tailoring can be seen as the main source of normativity in the social domain, in the specific situation here and now the expert is a relevant source too. Correct *is* normally what satisfies the socialized⁸ expert in this specific situation with all its complexities. So in my opinion we could see the expert as *a* (although not *the!*) source of normativity when he is operating within his familiar practices.

Appreciation does not need to be articulated explicitly. It primarily shows itself by being expressed in 'aesthetic reactions':

Perhaps the most important thing in connection with aesthetics is what may be called aesthetic reactions, e.g. discontent, disgust, discomfort. (LA, p. 13)

By these reactions Wittgenstein means expressions of (dis)appreciation by means of the craftsman's way of acting: his bodily postures, gestures, and facial expressions. The dynamic attitude of the craftsman directed at the object in its context shows what matters to him in the situation.⁹

It is crucial that Wittgenstein stresses the fact that these reactions of appreciation are *directed*. The relationship between the craftsman's reaction and the object is an internal relation.¹⁰ In Wittgenstein's works an intentional relation is always an internal relation.

We have here a kind of discomfort which you may call 'directed', e.g. if I am afraid of you, my discomfort is directed. ... We have given, as it were, a *grammatical* explanation (in saying, the feeling is 'directed'). (LA, p. 14)

'Grammatical relation' is another term Wittgenstein uses for internal relation (cf. Moore 1954, p. 316). In an internal relation the relata belong together in an intrinsic way. This internal necessity is of a normative nature.

⁸ The craftsman was socialized during a process of training and experience in a community of practitioners. See section 5.3 for more on this important topic.

⁹ We find a similar idea in Bennett and Hacker (2003, p. 218): 'In manifesting our emotions, we show what we care about.'

¹⁰ It is an internal relation and not an external relation or a causal relation. Note that Davidson's (1963) view that we are giving a form of causal explanation when we explain an action by giving reasons, does not devalue the main point that I am making here (that there is an internal relation between the relata), because Davidson is talking about *explicit* reasons. Explicit reasons do not play any role in the episodes of unreflective action to which I am confining myself in this paper.

3. Wittgenstein's directed discontent

In this section I will show that directed discontent is the most important reaction of appreciation because it involves the ability to make subtle distinctions, relevant to the situation (as opposed to 'all or nothing' reactions seen in directed disgust and directed discomfort).

3.1 *Directed discontent vs. directed discomfort*

Imagine an architect at work, correcting the design of a door:

The expression of discontent is not the same as the expression of discomfort. The expression of discontent ... says: 'Make it higher ... too low! ... do something to this.' (LA, p. 13)¹¹

Although elsewhere in the text Wittgenstein is clear about the responsiveness and object-directedness of both discontent and discomfort, he does not further explain the exact difference between directed discomfort and directed discontent. It strikes me that directed *discontent* crucially involves a more specific understanding of the situation than directed *discomfort*. A basic example of directed discomfort might be an experience like 'It just does not seem right to me' and more extreme examples would probably include destroying the object and starting again from scratch, or going home and leaving it all behind.

Directed *discontent* is related to the craftsman's ability to make all kinds of subtle discriminations instinctively and immediately in unreflective action. This enables him to see what should be done to improve the current situation or solve the problem; to perceive and act on possibilities for action (affordances). An example of directed discontent could be a situation in which the architect notices that the door in its architectural context is incorrect and immediately senses two relevant alternatives (make the door more narrow or make it higher), and, what is more, he responds immediately to the best of these two possibilities for action (saying: 'Make it higher', or by an equivalent non-verbal reaction). Here directed discontent seems to have the connotation of having a sense of the right proportions (or other specific aspects) of this object in its context.

Directed *discomfort*, on the other hand, seems to be more like a raw, undifferentiated rejection of the object. The architect is certain that as it

¹¹ One could comment that interfering by demanding such late alterations is disruptive. This is right but does not make Wittgenstein's description of this architect's behaviour less relevant. Nowadays, of course, most architects would make a 3D-design on their computer and a model. I claim that also in these cases directed discontent characterizes the architect's appreciation of, for example, the door or other aspects of her design. As said before, the process of developing a first design into something good generally requires a lot of time and this phase contains many episodes similar to the one described by Wittgenstein.

is the door is not right, which he might express by saying or gesturing 'Wrong!' (LA, p. 14). In this latter situation an experience of overall incorrectness exists, but a sense of the specific adequate alternatives is absent. In case of directed discomfort the rejection of the current state of affairs has an 'all or nothing' character; it is undifferentiated. I suggest that since expert craftsmen will normally immediately distinguish the relevant possibilities for action in situations within their familiar practices, directed discontent (and not directed discomfort) is their characteristic way of responding to the situation.

The role of first-person experience is of central importance for understanding Wittgenstein's notion of directed discontent. As the object becomes more and more correct, the amount of discontent experienced may decrease gradually. For the craftsman, the lived experience of being discontented with the object he is working on is internally related to its incorrectness. His experience changes with the improvement of the object and sometimes satisfaction may result (LA, p. 19).

When the architect sees that the door is too high, he is certain that the door is not correct 'like this'. He can instinctively express, gesture or say 'Too high!', without necessarily having in the back of his mind some explicit goal, for example, that the door should be 14.8 ft. high. Rather, thanks to a background of incorporated concerns and know-how, directed discontent enables him to improve the object step-by-step by letting himself be drawn to respond to the door in its context, until finally reaching a point of correctness and zero discontent or satisfaction.

3.2 The craftsman's justifications

One of the abilities of an expert craftsman is to give a justification of his appreciation verbally when the intersubjective situation requires it. For example when someone asks him for an explanation. Wittgenstein suggests that such an explicit explanation, which articulates his appreciation of (aspects of) the object, is a normative one based on reasons (LA, pp. 14–15, p. 21). The expression of appreciation can (potentially) be supplemented with or clarified by other expressions, verbal as well as non-verbal.

Note that this reason-giving type of normativity occurs after the fact. It can be distinguished from the situated and lived normativity manifested in expressions/reactions of directed discontent within unreflective action. Situated normativity is enacted here and now and shows itself in the adequacy of the changes made to an object. For the craftsman, explicit reasons play no role at that moment, even though he

would be able spontaneously to generate an adequate (albeit partial) answer to the 'why-question' if someone asked him.

I will now turn to discuss a case in which the flow of unreflective activity proceeds smoothly and the craftsman does not experience any discontent. How should we understand the notion of directed discontent in such a case?

3.3 Wittgenstein's case of a tailor at work

Wittgenstein's architect acts to improve an *incorrect* object: the door that is too low. Wittgenstein also describes the engaged unreflective action of an expert tailor working on a suit while all is well. He has a sense of the correct measurements of the fabric he is cutting for this specific person in this situation. When things are going smoothly, this expert craftsman does not need to deliberate, speak or represent the length in inches, he just cuts and is content. The excellent tailor does not deliberately control his action by means of his personal taste, but cuts the way he cuts because he experiences it as good 'like this' and has no tendency to act differently. For understanding the concept of directed discontent it is of crucial importance that he would experience wider as *too wide* and narrower as *too narrow*.

This sheds light on the nature of the normativity and emotion involved: cutting it this (right) way the tailor is content, doing it in another way he would not be (LA, p. 13). Correctness and directed discontent/content are internally related. The tailor's feel for the game is so well developed that his experience of (dis)contentment is even attuned to relevant developments in his environment that are neither perceived nor thought about by the tailor while interacting with the object, such as this year's fashion.¹² Although directed discontent as a concept has both first-person feeling and behavioural aspects, the craftsman does not necessarily always actually experience (dis)contentment in the concrete situation.

To conclude, Wittgenstein's craftsmen care about doing a good job. Directed discontent immediately orientates and 'draws' the craftsman's action towards improvement or correctness. This is an example of being moved to improve by an incorrect object (in context). More specifically, directed discontent expresses the appreciation of an object

¹² 'How does a fashion come about? Say, we wear lapels broader than last year. Does this mean that the tailors like them better broader? No, not necessarily. He cuts it like this and this year he makes it broader. Perhaps this year he finds it too narrow and makes it wider. ... But the tailor does not say: "This is nice." He is a good cutter. He is just contented. ... If you mean "this year he cuts it broader" then you can say this. This way we are contented, the other not.' (LA, p. 13 incl. note 2).

(in context) as not (yet) correct. Directed discontent describes an internal relation between, on the one hand, the behaviour and lived experience of a craftsman and, on the other, the object on which he is working. Although Wittgenstein does not explicitly discuss the role of the body, it becomes clear from the texts we discussed that know-how (*können*) and embodied concerns constitute the basis of the expert's contextual and normative sensitivity. It is important to note that such instinctive normative action also plays a role in cases of everyday unreflective action such as seeking the right word, which Wittgenstein (1953) discussed in his *Philosophical Investigations* (henceforth PI; see PI Ixi, p. 218 and LA, p. 18; Rietveld 2004).

4. Wittgenstein on the normativity of 'blind' rule following

I will now discuss Wittgenstein's ideas on one of the most unreflective forms of normative human action, namely the bedrock of action where one acts without justification, but not 'without right' (PI 289).

Using Harry Stein's (1997) analysis and along the lines of Rietveld (2008b), I will argue that for Wittgenstein both the bedrock of immediate action and 'blind' rule-following are inherently normative, that is, normative independent of the individual's possibility for reflection or linguistic expression. The normativity of unreflective action is not a derivative of reflective normativity. My interpretation of Wittgenstein's texts on this topic shares with McDowell's (1979, 1984, 1993) work on Wittgenstein the idea that unreflective action is not non-normative.¹³

Importantly, according to Wittgenstein a bedrock of immediate unreflective action underpins the practice of giving reasons and justifications. In his own words:

'How am I able to follow a rule?' —if this is not a question about causes, then it is about the justification for my following the rule in the way I do. If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: 'This is simply what I do.' (PI 217)

Moreover, the following of a rule is not the result of choosing to act in some way:

When I follow the rule, I do not choose. I follow the rule *blindly*. (PI 219)

Stein explains how we should understand Wittgenstein's bedrock of action where reasons and justifications no longer have any role to play. He presents (1997, pp. 210–13) four characteristics of bedrock—three

¹³ However, unlike McDowell, I deny *explicitly* that the possibility of reflection or propositional assessment plays a constitutive role for the normativity of 'blind' rule-following. Discussion of this issue will have to wait for another occasion.

uncontroversial and one debatable. Firstly, agreement on how to do things is shared with the other participants in socio-cultural practice. This is not a background of agreement in opinions, but a 'background of massive agreement in actions' (Stein 1997, p. 211; PI 241; Wittgenstein 1956 —henceforth RFM—VII-40). Secondly, thanks to this background we can settle local disagreements (Stein 1997, p. 211). Thirdly,

the fact that in following the rule as I do, I can *ultimately* only rely on a bedrock of unpremeditated action does not imply that an element of doubt or uncertainty pertains to my rule-following. (Stein 1997, p. 211)

On the contrary, Stein (1997, pp. 212–13) suggests, the fact that one is able to act 'blindly' should be seen as a manifestation of one's *certainty* about the correctness of one's rule-following. Within the embodied and situated account of lived normativity that I develop below, we can understand the normativity and the 'unassailable certainty of our actions' (Stein 1997, p. 233) at bedrock as two sides of the same coin.

The main controversy in the secondary literature on this Wittgensteinian topic concerns the normative status of the bedrock of immediate action. For example Kripke (1982) holds, according to Stein, that

the term 'bedrock' would designate a complex of brute behavioural inclinations and regularities; a non-normative domain that sustains our explicitly normative practices. (Stein 1997, p. 211)

Stein argues that even the important Wittgenstein scholars Baker and Hacker (1985) see bedrock as a non-normative domain because, in their account, normativity gets no foothold outside explicitly linguistic practices (Stein 1997, p. 213, pp. 228–33).¹⁴

McDowell's interpretation goes against these two influential interpretations of the (non-) normative status of bedrock. According to him Wittgenstein holds that even at this most basic level of behaviour we are still in the normative domain (McDowell 1984, pp. 241–2; PI 241). But how is it possible that a 'blind' response can be normative? It is the *context* of 'regular use' (PI 198), in which this response takes place that is crucial for this normativity (Stein 1997; McDowell 1984). Wittgenstein's

¹⁴ 'Baker and Hacker present an interpretation of bedrock that is similar to Kripke's in as far as they, too, regard bedrock as a basically non-normative realm. ... [T]he specifically normative nature of these [linguistic, ER] practices is in their view intrinsically and exclusively tied up with such explicitly verbal abilities as giving justifications and reasons, explaining the meaning of a word or formulating rules and describing acts of following them. Apart from such verbal practices, normativity can get no foothold. By implication, bedrock—which lies beyond these practices, must on itself be regarded as a non-normative domain which at best provides behavioural preconditions for genuine normativity that consists in our mutually shared employment of explanations, justifications or rule-formulations.' (Stein 1997, p. 213).

idea of a custom or practice provides us with a ‘middle course’, according to McDowell:

How can a performance both be nothing but a ‘blind’ reaction to a situation, not an attempt to act on an interpretation ... and be a case of going by a rule ... ? The answer is: by belonging to a custom (PI 198), practice (PI 202), or institution (RFM VI–31). (McDowell 1984, p. 242)

Not forgetting the communal custom that forms the context of a ‘blind’ response is the key to understanding that bedrock is inherently normative. Moreover, in such an account, being governed by normative constraints, or by what I call ‘lived normativity’ (cf. Kelly 2005, p. 107), has nothing occult about it but is simply one’s lived tendency, developed by past learning, to participate in such a custom (cf. McDowell 1984, p. 255). In my opinion, this interpretation by McDowell of Wittgenstein’s ideas on the normative status of bedrock is correct (I follow here also Stein 1997). McDowell (1984, pp. 254–5) rightly sees that our unreflective actions are situated within communal practice and that this is crucial for understanding the normativity involved.

To conclude, what matters for understanding the normativity of (even ‘blind’) rule-following according to Wittgenstein, is not that one has the capacity for linguistic articulation or reflection but simply that one is reliably participating in a communal custom. Given that normativity is constituted by the communal custom in which the individual’s performance is embedded, mistakes by the skilled individual are possible. Thus, even though in unreflective action a performance is not undertaken for any explicit reasons, it can fail. It is thanks to this complex context that the skilled individual’s unreflective performance, which typically is, in a sense, nothing but a ‘blind’ response to relevant affordances (namely the individual’s being moved to respond by them), is normative nevertheless.

5. On being moved to improve by relevant affordances

In this final section I will investigate further what it is to allow oneself to be moved to improve by an object or by affordances. What are the main characteristics of this phenomenon? How should we understand, for example, the way we are motivated to obtain and maintain an appropriate distance from others in an elevator? I will pay special attention to the situated nature of the normativity implied in being moved to *improve*. How is it possible that an expert craftsman’s situated and lived normativity is in accordance with norms constituted in the socio-cultural practice? How do norms compel him? (Some amount of repe-

tion will be inevitable in this section due to the fact that I am discussing the skilled individual-environment system from various perspectives.)

5.1 *Transient episodes of unreflective action occur in a complex context*

The individual's sensitivity to the rich context of unreflective action has for now been sufficiently clarified thanks to our discussion of the cases of expert craftsmen. I will return to it in section 5.3. With respect to this topic I just wish to add that being moved to improve is a transient state, because of the requirement that the expert maintains an engaged (rather than detached) mode of interaction with the situation.

5.2 *The internal relation between affective behaviour and the normative adequacy of the object*

What can we say about the relationship between normativity and affective behaviour? Recall that I introduced the notion 'affective behaviour' to do justice to the fact that the craftsman's appreciation in action in a sense precedes the distinction between emotion and cognition. Just like directed discontent, being moved to improve is an affective and behavioural response to an object (or affordance) that takes account of the complex situational context. Hence it makes sense to portray being moved to improve as directed affective behaviour.

The engaged expert's expressive behaviour is internally related to the normative adequacy of the object on which he is working. Therefore, we can describe the state of the whole system made up by the expert directed at the object in its context equally well by referring to, for instance, the present state of the *object* in the world (not yet correct, but being improved), to the *behaviour* of the expert (she is improving the object), to the *expression* on her face (dissatisfied with the object), or to her first-person *experience* ('I am still not content with it'). This is what licenses my claim that in such unreflective action correctness and first-person experience are related, and even the further claim that we encountered in my reading of Wittgenstein's text in section 2 above: correct *is* normally what satisfies the socialized expert.

It is also the reason why it is not wrong to say that her first-person experience 'indicates' adequacy or inadequacy for the expert. We can say that, as long as we do not forget that at that very same moment various other 'indicators' of normative (in)adequacy are also present in the body-environment system: the object, the expert's shouting in frustration, his or her posture, gestures, facial expression, or perhaps even his or her sweating. So the expert's being satisfied does not constitute ade-

quacy by itself. It is his or her correction of the object (behaving rightly) that does. However, given that normally the craftsman's state of satisfaction is internally related to the adequacy of the object, being satisfied does normally indicate normative adequacy in unreflective action.

When I say that an expert allows himself to be moved by the situation, this means that the expert responds to, for example, the inadequacy of the object (in context); or described from another angle, that the object 'invites' improvement. Given the fact that here the development of a bodily readiness to improve the object and the emotion experience are like two sides of the same coin; improving the object implies simultaneously reducing dissatisfaction and improving the situation as a whole. Note that the expert's response does not only decrease his experienced normative tension, but also simultaneously changes something in the intersubjective world: the object. As such the lived normativity of being moved to improve by the object is publicly expressed and others who are familiar with the practice can understand and criticize what is happening.

5.3 *The link between normativity at the level of practice and the individual's situated and lived normativity*

What about the link between normativity at the level of the expert's socio-cultural practice and the individual's situated and lived normativity? In matters of expertise, normative adequacy of an object is ultimately not founded in any individual's appreciation, but in a practice, which characterizes the community's practitioners' equivalent ways of acting manifested over time. Therefore, situated normativity in these cases has to be related somehow to the norms of a socio-cultural tradition. Moreover, it is interesting that normally one is not literally forced by anyone to act correctly, one is not *actually* bound by anything, but nevertheless one can experience the feeling that one should act in this way or perhaps that way, but not differently. How is the acting individual *compelled* by norms? I suggest that besides skills, embodied concerns play a key role here. Concerns underlie emotions (Frijda 1986) and affective behaviour. According to Bennett and Hacker (2003, p. 217),

the manifestation of an emotion exhibits an appraisal of people, things or events relative to one's concerns (and one's concerns may stretch far beyond one's personal welfare and illfare).¹⁵

¹⁵ Explicitly articulated end states can be understood as a subset of the individual's concerns (cf. Lambie and Marcel 2002, p. 229).

This broad notion of concern is in line with what we know from the psychology of emotion: emotions are related to that which *matters* to an organism (Frijda 1986).¹⁶

When considering the impact of social norms on behaviour we have to avoid the fallacy of ascribing some independent power to norms; to avoid thinking that they can influence people from the outside like a puppeteer and his strings do with his puppets. Norms do not actively do anything with people, they do not steer behaviour; only individuals do things (Voestermans and Verheggen 2007, p. 17). Then how should we see social norms? We should distinguish between explicit social norms and underlying patterns of activities. Explicit social norms are best understood as useful abstractions from a third-person perspective that articulate the regularities that are already manifest in the coordinated behaviour of a community of individuals. These underlying regularities are what we should primarily be interested in, because people are already doing something when a norm is expressed explicitly by an observer (Voestermans and Verheggen 2007, p. 59).

So the question we should ask is the following: How is it possible that an architect in a concrete situation feels compelled to act in line with these established patterns? The answer to this question lies in the temporally extended learning processes shaping her behaviour and her embodied sensitivities. These skills and concerns are acquired in significant but very specific situations within a group of experts, who are all also involved in their wider communities (Voestermans and Verheggen 2007; Baerveldt and Voestermans 2005). The development of expertise thus results from recurrent activities amid a collection of other cooperating individuals who already adhere to these established patterns (Voestermans and Verheggen 2007). Let me elaborate on this.

5.3.1 *Training and coordination of activities*

For understanding how these regular patterns emerge out of the actions of individuals, the focus should not be primarily on the individual, but on the relationships between individuals interacting face-to-face while engaged in an activity. Consider, for example, the way in which the participants in a game involving throwing a ball are continuously and rapidly adjusting their behaviour in accordance with the feedback they receive from the other person. *Coordinated* activities of individuals lead

¹⁶ It is important to note that emotion is a very broad concept in Frijda (1986). According to him emotions are changes in *action readiness* that are generated as a reaction to objects or events that are appraised as relevant to the concerns of the individual.

to the patterns of actions in practices (Voestermans and Verheggen 2007; Baerveldt and Voestermans 2005).

An excellent architect has been selected and trained by other architects and over time her behaviour has become attuned to their already established ways of acting. Learning from critical feedback by those who have already mastered the craft, training hard, trying over and over again, she develops preferences and sensitivities along the lines of the examples set by these experts. This way she develops a 'feeling' for the situation and the ability to assess, and if necessary to correct her own performance. An important part of this attunement to the practice happens implicitly, *without noticing* that it is occurring, as, for example when she inattentively imitates the required behaviour. Even during a process of explicit instruction there can still be simultaneously a lot of implicit learning and shaping of concerns.¹⁷ In the long run, the community's established ways of acting become ingrained and our architect will finally display appropriate action instinctively, in Wittgenstein's sense.¹⁸ It has become a practice or custom due to this training and to a continuously refined history of lived experience. Due to all this largely unobtrusive and unnoticed disciplining of the body the architect has learned to see what is right and what is not. She has developed a 'nose' for situations in the field of architecture.

5.3.2 *The priority relationship between the individual and the social dimensions of normativity*

Up to now I have tried to do justice to *both* the individual and the social dimensions of normativity, without reducing the normativity of the practice to either the individual or the social. Let me try to make explicit why I think that it is better avoid this reduction.

First of all, it is important to make the distinction between (a) what is the content of a norm, and (b) what constitutes the norm (Stein 1997). The question of the content of a norm can be answered by the people who are familiar with the pattern of actions in the relevant practice. In order to understand this content one has to focus primarily on the (historical) communal pattern of actions, as we have seen above. It is precisely this necessity of looking at the social dimension for under-

¹⁷ These may be as trivial as developing a greater probability of liking a certain type of eyeglasses or black clothes due to one's mere repeated exposure to them (Zajonc 2004). This mere exposure effect occurs only as long as there is absence of aversive consequences following the presentation (Zajonc 2004).

¹⁸ Note that normativity does not only manifest itself when behaviour is appropriate, but also when one consciously goes against the norm. These latter acts, however, will often be reflective rather than unreflective and as such are outside the scope of this paper.

standing the content of the norm that makes it impossible to reduce the normativity of the practice to that which pertains to the level of the individual.

The main debate on the priority relationship between the individual and the social dimensions of normativity concerns the constitutive question (b). Luntley (2003) argues that all patterns of activity emerge from actions by individuals. That is correct but does not settle the priority relationship in favour of the level of the individual, because the way in which an individual acts in cases of human expertise will be strongly influenced by prior training and experience within a socio-cultural practice. However, this also does not settle the priority relationship in favour of the social conception of practice (Williams 1999), because the natural capacity to learn from experienced situations has to be present for the individual to be trainable by others. It is an important fact of human nature that newborns already have the innate capacity to be moved affectively by others (Hobson 2004). They respond negatively to rejection and positively to encouragement. Reviewing the literature from developmental psychology, Hobson (2004) argues that this innate ability for interpersonal emotional engagement provides a foundation for beginning to learn; for becoming attuned to certain regularities and over time learning to act in accordance with rules. This innate capacity for this form of value-based learning is crucial because it shows that the individual's concerns play a role from the start. Another aspect of the foundation for learning is the tendency of the newborn to imitate other people (Hobson 2004; Meltzoff and Moore 1977).

She does this [imitation] automatically, in the sense that she is drawn into doing it— ... provided she is interested and engaged enough with other people. ... [I]nfants are innately equipped to be moved [by others] in this way. (Hobson 2004, pp. 74–5)

The innate capacity of the individual to be moved (both affectively and in action) is crucial for learning and is presupposed by those who emphasize exclusively the social constitution of the normativity of the practice.

So with respect to the constitution of the normative patterns of actions, the important thing to keep in mind is the empirical fact that the individual infant 'is innately fashioned to coordinate with the social behaviour of other people' (Hobson 2004, p. 39). Hobson gives the following example of a shared situation in which an infant learns through someone else:

The child starts out by reacting to the world in her own terms. She finds a toy alluring, for example. She then perceives her mother relating to that toy with disgust or fear. According to the mother's reaction, the toy is not so alluring. What then happens is that the toy loses its appeal for the child herself. Its meaning has changed because of what it means to someone else. ... The discovery is a discovery in action and feeling, rather than a discovery in thought. (Hobson 2004, p. 73)

This sheds some light on the way social feedback works in the coordination of action: the girl adjusts on-line through being directly affected by her mother's reaction to the object. Already the earliest situations of correction or encouragement of an infant by a parent have two sides. Being corrected is a normative event that happens between two or more individuals interacting in a shared situation. On the other hand, this is a bodily interaction that impacts the individual at the level of the (learning) mechanisms of embodied cognition: an event appraised negatively and impacting the body's affective well-being and/or (possible) actions (cf. Frijda 2007, pp. 106–11). As such, it is a moment in a learning history and contributes to the development of the individual's skills and concerns. Assuming that experts continue to refine their skills, one interesting aspect of situated and lived normativity is that the situation in which this phenomenon occurs plays a role at these two levels simultaneously: extending the established communal pattern of actions and extending the embodied learning history.

5.3.3 *The roles of perception and affordances*

The way in which one perceives the environment changes over the course of this process of becoming adequately sensitized to situations. I have mentioned that the situations encountered during a learning history are highly specific. No situation is identical to one lived before. Perception has the important role of generalizing over these variations (Freeman 2000). However, this generalization occurs in a manner that also does justice to the significant differences between the various situations (Freeman 2000). Everything the craftsman has learned over the years feeds back into the way the meaningful world appears to him in his perception. Merleau-Ponty (PP; cf. Dreyfus 2002a) calls this feedback loop the '*intentional arc*'. Our past experience determines which possibilities for action attract us. Thanks to this process the craftsman perceives a *relevant* affordance and is directly motivated to act. Perception underlies the expert's ability to be responsive to the situation and immediately make subtle discriminations, like Wittgenstein's architect did when he was correcting the design of the door. When skilled, perception is no

longer mere viewing but is seeing certain relevant things with much greater acuity. Other things remain in the background or are ignored.

Perception and action are directly linked. Merleau-Ponty (PP) discusses the example of a wallet maker in his familiar environment who perceives the world around him in terms of his possibilities for action.¹⁹

[T]he subject, when put in front of his scissors, needle and familiar tasks, does not need to look for his hands or his fingers, because they are ... potentialities already mobilized by the perception of scissors or needle, the central end of those 'intentional threads' which link him to the objects given. ... [It] is the piece of leather 'to be cut up'; it is the lining 'to be sewn'. (PP, pp. 121–2)

This is a good example of the way the motor potentialities of the body are provoked or recruited by affordances. The body that is attuned to its environment does not deliberate but allows itself to be invited, so to speak, by the perceived possibilities for action in the given situation. The body's skills are immediately potentiated by some of the meaningful or alluring objects around it, responding to the piece of leather as that which is 'to be cut up'; to a possibility for action in this situation (affordance). Similarly, in the concluding chapter of *Phenomenology of Perception* Merleau-Ponty writes about unreflective action in general:

we ... have a world, that is, a collection of things which emerge from a background of formlessness by presenting themselves to our body as 'to be touched', 'to be taken', 'to be climbed over'. (PP, p. 512)

I have discussed the relationship between affordances and the body's motor potentialities in more detail elsewhere (Rietveld 2008a).

In concrete situations of skilled activity a form of embodied intelligence is 'motivated' by the situation, as mentioned in the introduction. This process of being responsive to affordances is inseparable from the craftsman's concerns, because he perceives a *relevant* solicitation to act, an affordance that matters to him and is experienced as attractive or repulsive. The engaged craftsman never perceives his situation in a neutral way. Before any stimulus arrives, something is already there: a skilled individual with certain concerns involved in some action. These concerns have been shaped through past learning in his practice and determine what shows up as relevant for him in this specific situation.

¹⁹The wallet maker in this case was not an expert craftsman but Goldstein's famous patient Schneider who had acquired brain damage in the First World War. After his brain damage this person had several disabilities, which I cannot go into now (see Dreyfus (2007) and Van Grunsven (unpublished) for interesting discussions of this case). What is relevant for me here is that he could still perform the familiar activities of wallet making and that, while doing so, he was still adequately responsive to affordances. That Merleau-Ponty's description of the wallet maker's responsiveness to affordances (quoted in the main text) is well suited for understanding *normal* unreflective action is corroborated by another passage on normal behaviour from the concluding chapter of *Phenomenology of Perception*, which is also quoted in the main text.

To conclude, the skills and concerns that the individual expert brings to the situation form the link between normativity at the level of the expert's socio-cultural practice and the individual's situated and lived normativity. Their embodied nature makes individuals immediately sensitive to aspects of the situation. The architect's concerns have been shaped in the social situations that prevail in the field of architecture. These concerns give rise to *adequate* affective behaviour because perceived objects and events that matter to the individual produce, simultaneously, bodily intentions to improve the situation and affective responses. Situated and lived normativity *presupposes embodied concerns*. Once certain things matter to someone, one may be affectively influenced. These concerns operate at the level of the skillful body and immediately tie the individual to the normative order by producing appropriate affective behaviour. Note that experts typically care about the adequacy of the objects they produce. In section 5.6 we will see in more detail that this concern for adequacy of performance is important for understanding their lived normativity.

5.4 How adequate reactions can be immediate

How can adequate reactions be immediate? It is characteristic of skills and affective responses that they do their job without the interference of explicit deliberation. Consider the way we can drive absent-mindedly or react to a small but significant obstruction (cf. Rietveld 2008a; Klaassen et al. 2006). The perception of the object (in context) can *immediately* produce affective behaviour (behaviour and affective experience) in line with the existing patterns.

Affective experience *and* the tendency to act *and* normative orientation (improvement of the object) are directly related. In a sense directed discontent is a paradigmatic way in which the craftsman's behaviour is tied to the normative order in the concrete situation. Even though the way in which the individual is responsive to the situation has been shaped by a history of activity in practice, here and now it is this individual's object-directed affective behaviour that orients the flow of activity in a way that is normatively adequate and *immediate*. With respect to such an episode of unreflective action no additional story about operations at the mental level is needed (for example in terms of having a propositional representation of a goal, following explicit or implicit rules, or reflecting consciously or even unconsciously). The craftsman is just allowing himself to be moved to improve by the object.

5.5 On object-directed responsiveness

It is now time to discuss the relationship between instinctive normative action and the responsive attitude. We have seen that a certain responsiveness to the other's emotional engagement and actions is already characteristic of human infants (Hobson 2004). Craftsmen, moreover, have developed a responsiveness to the affordances of the objects particular to their craft. Responsiveness can be blocked by adopting an attitude of detachment or disengagement. In such an attitude 'one is set for not acting', which blocks the normal direct embodied impact of events on emotion and action (Frijda 2007, p. 111).

The engaged architect that Wittgenstein (LA) describes is as much the generator of instinctive normative action in this particular situation as he is compelled by the door to improve it. In the disengaged attitude we can reflect on our explicit reasons, deliberate, and decide what is the right thing to do.²⁰ But when one possesses a skill and is dealing with the object in an engaged way, one can just allow oneself to be responsive to the pull of the relevant affordances and be moved to improve the situation.

Directed discontent ties the *responsive* individual to the normative order. The constraints lived by the individual (e.g. feeling compelled to act thus) in the situation are not constraints for a subject reflecting in a disengaged way, but for a skillful and concerned individual absorbed in a task. Due to its bodily nature, such a constraint has more to do with a concrete physical activation of the neural (pre-)motor system, autonomic arousal, muscle tension, and gut reactions than with explicit or implicit rules. It is about the body being affected by and responding to an event. Responsive behaviour can be constrained in an immediate way by the circumstances because situated normativity is lived as affective behaviour (e.g. directed discontent).

As soon as action becomes reflective in a disengaged way, this *immediate* motivating character of the object disappears. Such detached reflection can certainly lead to action and to feelings, but ends the responsive immediacy. At that moment the nature of cognition changes from being moved to improve, to acting to improve, and the nature of normativity changes from situated normativity to explicit normativity. Thus, for the phenomenon of being moved to improve to arise, it is essential that the individual maintains a responsive attitude towards the object. It is important to note that the expert nevertheless, or perhaps precisely thanks to this lack of detached reflection, is able to take the complex particular situational context into account.

²⁰ To avoid misunderstandings it is important to note that not all deliberation is disengaged.

5.6 Can we say more about the way affective experience and normativity are related?

I will now consider the relationship between normativity and affective experience more closely. The acquisition of a skill gives rise to the ability to respond unreflectively to affordances, to anticipate outcomes of actions,²¹ and to have a sense of how things are going. All those aspects have affective components.

Expertise implies the presence of a concern for the adequacy of relevant objects. This concern opens the way for affective perturbations such as discontent. A conclusion like this is in line with Frijda's (1986, 2004, 2007) influential psychological theory of emotion, which emphasizes the intrinsic connection between emotion and action, but, additionally, calls attention to the normativity involved. Affective experience and the action tendency to improve the object are like two sides of the same coin. This is important because it implies that the affective dimension of directed discontent (and, more generally, of being moved to improve by relevant affordances) is an intrinsic aspect of *adequate* performance. A peculiar type of affective behaviour is essential for getting things right without deliberation. Given the cognitive but non-propositional character of unreflective action, such a conclusion is expected to be relevant for the debate in (the philosophy of) cognitive science on the role of emotion in cognition (see for instance De Sousa 2008).

In general, becoming an expert changes what matters to a person. During his years of experience in the socio-cultural practice, the craftsman has learned to care about the rightness of the right things. This history has an impact on the way situations are perceived and discriminations are made. Becoming an expert gives rise to both a concern for adequacy of certain task performances (for the normative rightness of the objects on which one works) and the ability to realize this concern, that is, the capacity to perceive and act on subtle possibilities for action in the situation. When this concern for adequacy is perturbed, (e.g. when an incorrect object is attended to) an immediate tendency for active correction of the situation arises.²²

²¹ Note that anticipating outcomes can include the ability to anticipate critical feedback from peers. Unreflective anticipation of future criticism may, on some occasions at least, generate affective behaviour here and now and motivate a search for further improvement of the object at hand.

²² This rapid process of change in posture and expression has aptly been called a change in action readiness by Frijda (1986, 2004).

6. Conclusion

To conclude, skills and concerns get their shape within a socio-cultural practice. Once they are acquired the relationship between body and world is modified. Situated normativity can be understood as the normative aspect of skillful action in context; of embodied cognition in unreflective action. Wittgenstein's descriptions of directed discontent are paradigmatic examples of situated normativity. Responsiveness to *relevant* affordances forms the core of the normative aspect of unreflective action. The phenomenology of this can be characterized as being moved to improve by relevant affordances.

Directed discontent and, more generally, being moved to improve, emphasize the noteworthy combination of object-directed responsiveness, context sensitivity, emotion, and normative instinct that is characteristic of skillful unreflective action.

Note that the expert's adequate response does not only decrease her dissatisfaction, but also changes something in the intersubjective world: it corrects the object. I have argued that the phenomenon of being moved to improve suggests that there is a crucial role for affective behaviour in getting things right without deliberation. In the concrete situation it binds the enculturated individual's behaviour to social norms. This central role of affective behaviour also sheds light on the lived experience of normative constraint; the much neglected phenomenon of lived normativity.

I have focused in this paper on specialized domains of expertise. It remains to be seen how far instinctive normative action can be extended in the context of everyday unreflective action. We will have to investigate various intermediate cases with varying degrees of normative and contextual richness. For example, can we apply the conceptual framework of being moved to improve to the preparation of soup by a professional cook as well as by the person who is skillfully preparing dinner at home? To me it seems that all of the above suggests that we can, but it will still require some work to articulate the conditions under which we can do so. The fact that instinctive normative action also plays a role in the everyday skill of seeking the right word provides additional support (LA, p. 18, PI IIXi, p. 218). But such an extension of the analysis of instinctive normative action to other skill domains will have to wait until another occasion. One of the important conditions is probably that the person cares enough about the consequences of his actions or the quality of his performance (in the case of experts such emotional engagement is typically high).

For philosophers and empirical scientists interested in intentionality or normativity the challenge is to understand better how relevant affordances move us towards improvement. Elsewhere I have tried to dig deeper into this matter (Rietveld 2008b). An interesting and urgent open question that I will not go into now is the following: What do these insights in the functioning of situated normativity imply for our understanding of everyday ethical know-how?²³

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